Commonwealth Office the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal found that the relevant standard of 'victim status' that applies in secret surveillance cases consists in a potential risk to be subjected to surveillance and that the European Convention on Human Rights does not apply to the surveillance of individuals who reside outside of the UK. This note argues that the Tribunal's finding regarding the victim status of the applicants was sound but that the underlying reasoning was not. The note further concludes that the Tribunal's finding on extraterritoriality is unsatisfactory and that its engagement with the European Court of Human Rights case law on the matter lacked depth. Finally, the note considers the defects of Human Rights Watch and the case law on extraterritoriality more generally against the backdrop of the place of principled reasoning in human rights adjudication.
INTRODUCTION
Have you ever made a phone call, sent an email, or, you know, used sharing under PRISM and Upstream were unlawful and contravened article 8 ECHR prior to the disclosures in the same judgments. 13 Liberty/Privacy No 3 found that Tempora, the system operated pursuant to section 8(4) of RIPA 2000 warrants, was legal and complied with the ECHR.
14 After these findings were published, Privacy International launched the campaign mentioned above. 663 applications were made through the campaign webpage, each of which contained both a human rights claim and a domestic law complaint. 15 They asserted that the applicants believed to be affected by either information sharing according to PRISM and Upstream and/or by Tempora and challenged the lawfulness of these measures under the ECHR or RIPA 2000 and internal procedures
respectively. 16 The judgment in Human Rights Watch followed a request of the Respondents to dismiss all applications based on the fact that the proceedings in Liberty/Privacy had resolved any future applications (including the ones before the Tribunal now) on the same issues. 17 It dealt with the first ten of the applications in order to determine if any of them and the remaining ones should be considered. 18 As such the Tribunal's determinations are on the preliminary issues of victim status or locus standi and the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the ECHR. 19 The IPT held that the complaints were not res judicata as a refusal to look at each claim separately would be contrary to ECtHR case law and the Tribunal's duties according to RIPA 2000. The IPT found that such a refusal would undermine its own function of judicial oversight. 20 Consequently, the Tribunal determined that it will consider all domestic law complaints pursuant to section 65(2)(b) of RIPA 2000 so long as the claimants submit further information to demonstrate that they are potentially at risk of surveillance. 21 Importantly, complaints will be considered regardless of whether the applicant in question was at any material time present in the UK or not. without showing a potential risk of surveillance because the IPT itself is a court of first instance and cannot rely on the existence of remedies to justify higher standards of access. As mentioned, the ECtHR in Kennedy allowed for the mixed standard requiring the applicant to show a 'potential risk' of surveillance precisely because the UK has a judicial mechanism in the form of the IPT. 42 The harmonised approach in Zhakarov explicitly confirms this rationale. 43 If the IPT now adopts the (slightly)
higher hurdle involving 'potential risk' of surveillance as opposed to the more generous standard of an actual abstract challenge of the legal framework to access the very procedures that gave rise to its justification in the first place, the purpose of the 'potential risk' version of the victim status is defeated.
None of this is to say that access to the IPT is not an effective domestic remedy, nor that the Tribunal's conclusion is unsound. different principles than the ECtHR in order to justify that the applicant must show that they are 'potentially at risk' that intelligence services have compiled information concerning their private life. 79 Instead of ignoring this inconvenient state of affairs, the Tribunal should have engaged in its own principled reasoning if it wanted to justify why this standard is an appropriate rule.
Turning now to the issue of extraterritoriality, it is again useful to start with an analysis of the ECtHR's reasoning. Green distinguishes between principles and rules in order to elucidate that Convention rights are best understood as principles.
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However, there is no reason to restrict the use of the distinction as such to the interpretation of Convention rights. 81 In fact, the case law dealing with extraterritoriality in light of article 1 of the ECHR is an example to the contrary. The provision reads and operates like a generalised rule: 82 'The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in section 1 of this Convention.' However, because it is a generalisation it still needs to be interpreted by recourse to the principles and values that justify it.
Seemingly aware of the need for further interpretation and thus aiming to duly justify the rule, the ECtHR speaks of 'general principles relevant to jurisdiction' 83 when ascertaining what jurisdiction means. However, the Court does not actually operationalize its 'principles' as such. The Court starts from the assumption that there is a 'territorial principle', that is, it deems jurisdiction to be primarily exercised on national territory. 84 As described above, the ECtHR has developed what it calls 'exceptional circumstances capable of giving rise to the exercise of jurisdiction… outside territorial boundaries' 85 . However, framing competing considerations as exceptions 86 to a principle does not sit easily with the understanding of principles adopted here. A principle does not have exceptions, only rules do. 87 Instead, principles are requirements of justice or morality more generally that point in one direction and have a dimension of weight in the sense that they can be deemed more or less important depending on the salience of the underpinning value in a given case. Second, the term jurisdiction (as opposed to territory) should be understood to ensure that cases where territory does not make a moral difference are treated alike. 93 That is, if a state has the same kind of power regardless of whether the victim of a human rights violation is within or outside its territory said state should be held to the same standards under the ECHR in both situations.
The next question is what exactly needs to be within the power of public institutions. The IPT actually grapples with this question in Human Rights Watch but does not go beyond pointing out that the ECtHR has only ruled on power over property and that information does not count as such. 94 What the Tribunal (and the ECtHR, for that matter) does not recognise is that the relevant value here is again equality, but that the salient principle needs to relate to articles 1 (jurisdiction) and 8
(privacy) of the Convention. In conjunction, equality and the right to protection of 88 ibid 26-27. 89 As the ECHR is an international treaty, the starting point of interpretation according to international law is articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The reasoning suggested here would be accommodated by article 31 (1) because it is an interpretation of the ordinary meaning of the term jurisdiction in the light of the object and purpose of the ECHR. 90 For another example of reasoning appealing to values and principles see n 47 above. 91 n 81 above 114-117. 92 Versions of this view are defended in n 47 above 862-866 and n 56 above 166-168. See also n 81 above 117. 93 For a similar view regarding the role of citizenship rather than territory see n 59 above 87- However, the ECtHR when it has dealt with extraterritoriality in the past has not employed any reasoning of this kind. Instead, the Court spawned a number of 'leading' judgments based on a need-to-decide basis, patch-work case law at best. … As the Court has, in these cases, always tailored its tenets to sets of specific facts, it is hardly surprising that those tenets then seem to limp when applied to sets of different facts.
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The ECtHR fashions what it calls principles to accommodate specific facts rather than asking what values underpin them. Despite the use of the term 'principle', the Court's reasoning when it comes to extraterritoriality is not actually principled in the sense employed here. This is not to say that all judgments by the ECtHR on this issue reached the wrong conclusion. Rather, the complaint is that the structure of the reasoning itself is problematic. As will be discussed next, this has significant ramifications beyond the case law of the Court. Instead, the actual problem is the much deeper one of a lack of principled reasoning.
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A certain frustration about this state of affairs shows when the IPT states that it cannot find that the individuals residing abroad were within the jurisdiction of the UK because the ECtHR had failed to clearly decide that they are. 97 Given all this, a one- Comparing the case law on extraterritoriality to the cases on victim status renders the lack of principled reasoning even more evident. As discussed above, the Court looks at article 34 of the ECHR, concluding that it is a principle and that it can be trumped by other, more important or salient, principles. That is, the ECtHR considers the function of the complaint mechanism and concludes that it is underpinned by at least two different principles: the righting of wrongs in case of interferences and that 
A CONCLUSION
The IPT in Human Rights Watch found mostly for the claimants. It held that its previous findings did not preclude further proceedings in this case, provided that the claimants supply further information, and the Tribunal adopted a generous approach to the issue of victim status. While the reasoning on which the IPT's approach to the victim status of the claimants rested was questionable, the result was not. Further, the hope was that the IPT in Human Rights Watch would clarify the extraterritorial application of the ECHR in cases concerning mass surveillance. However, the Tribunal never got around to that; the case law so far delivered by the ECtHR on the matter of extraterritoriality never did and still does not allow for it. The underlying problem is not that the Tribunal was unwilling to engage with relevant cases but the lack of principled reasoning. This is an unhappy state of affairs, not only because the wait for the much needed clarification continues, but also because it leaves much to be desired in terms of progress in the matter generally speaking.
